The Expansion of the Qing Dynasty of China and the Zunghar Mongol State
Abstract and Keywords
The Manchus, a powerful military state in northeast Eurasia, declared the founding of the Qing dynasty in the early 17th century. They conquered Beijing in 1644, and the core of Ming China by the end of the century, but they continued to expand into Central Eurasia, creating China’s largest enduring empire. Their most formidable rivals were the Mongols organized in the Zunghar state, which dominated western Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet. Through daring military expeditions, adroit diplomacy, and extensive economic mobilization, the Qing rulers eliminated the Zunghar state, establishing uncontested power over Central Eurasia. After the conquest, the Manchus consolidated control of the region with productive economic policies, with extensive surveying and mapping, and by producing an official account of their military achievements. Qing expansion and Zunghar resistance left strong legacies for the definition of the territory of the empire and the Chinese nation that succeeded it in the 20th century.
Introduction: Qing Expansion
In the late 16th century, a bold young man in northeastern Eurasia assembled his companions and began campaigning against his fellow kinsmen, who were members of tribes engaging in hunting, fishing, and pastoralism. He gained permission to trade with the Ming dynasty to the south, and gradually gathered more men, weapons, and wealth. His successors, in the early 17th century, formed a powerful military state, declared themselves a new people, the Manchus, and named themselves as the rulers of a new dynasty, the Qing, in 1636. By 1644 they had captured Beijing, the Ming emperor had committed suicide, and the Manchu armies drove south. They took all of former Ming territory, but they continued military expansion well beyond the limits of the Ming. After taking Taiwan, an island that no previous dynasty had conquered, the Kangxi emperor turned his attention to the northwest, where the ancient rivals of Chinese dynasties, the Mongols, had formed a powerful new confederation, known as the Zunghars. Under their dynamic leader, Galdan [r. 1671–1697], they controlled much of Mongolia and Xinjiang and had substantial influence in Tibet. The Kangxi emperor, in a series of campaigns, defeated Galdan, winning many Mongols to his side, but the Zunghar confederation survived, and even thrived, under later leadership, until the Qianlong emperor crushed the Mongolian state and nearly eliminated the identity of the Zunghars in the mid-18th century. After eliminating the Zunghar state, the Qing rulers established firm control over Mongolia and Xinjiang, and a high degree of indirect influence in Tibet. The last independent Mongolian challenge to a Chinese dynasty had disappeared. The Qing would hold these regions against Russian threats until the collapse of the dynasty in 1911, and the People’s Republic of China today still firmly dominates the region, with the exception of independent Mongolia.
The great Qing expansion over these two centuries nearly tripled the land area under the control of a single dynasty, and it created permanent domination of the eastern portion of Central Eurasia. It laid the basis for the economic boom, population growth, migration of peoples, and geopolitical claims to hegemony that still underlie the modern Chinese nation-state. None of these imperial achievements would have been possible without the defeat of the Zunghar state. For this reason, we may regard the final defeat of the Zunghars as a major turning point in Chinese and Central Eurasian history. But it was by no means a foregone conclusion. The Zunghars had a powerful army, extensive skills in cavalry and even artillery warfare, a literate class of rulers, and the rudiments of an administrative structure, as well as allies among the Mongols and Tibetans. Only by mobilizing economic and military resources on a large scale, using exceptional diplomatic skill, and enjoying a good deal of luck could the Qing ensure their defeat.
The following outlines the story of Qing expansion, with a focus on the Zunghar campaigns, in order to illustrate underlying dynamics of Qing state and society. Only a few studies in English have given an extensive narrative of these campaigns; this will only sketch the major events, and also discuss their political, economic, social, and cultural implications.
Recently, new works on the frontier regions of the Qing Empire have flourished, so we now have extensive, nuanced knowledge of many phenomena. These new works avoid simple assertions of the grandeur of empire, or claims that the modern nation-state of China derives simply from the achievements of earlier dynasties. Instead, they stress cross-border interactions, multicultural engagements, and global economic linkages, placing the Qing story in a larger history. We are beginning to see China’s modern history as part of world history, but much more remains to be done.
The Ecology of Military Formations
The peoples of northeast Eurasia lived in a zone of mixed ecologies, and they took advantage of multiple resources to support their way of life. (The Modern Chinese terminology for this region is “northeast China”; the common Western term is “Manchuria,” but neither is entirely accurate. Here “northeast Eurasia” is used as an approximate term covering modern northeastern China [Dongbei], eastern Mongolia, and parts of eastern Siberia.) The taiga covered the far north, where Arctic peoples and reindeer herders roamed desolate plains. Dense forest farther south supported many groups who relied on forest products, gold mining, fishing, and animals. The grassland steppe in the western portion connected to pastoral nomads, who raised sheep, horses, and other animals and migrated between pasturelands. In the southern region, where rainfall and climate favored agriculture, peasant farmers grew crops of millet and soybeans. The people who became the Manchus united all these regions in a single military and social formation, creating out of relatively sparse resources and a small population a powerful state apparatus that could confront the huge Ming Empire to the south.
In this frontier zone, institutional innovations allowed the rapid coalescence of these peoples into a single state. The banners, which were military registration and conscription systems that incorporated entire families and ethnic groups, formed the basis of the early Manchu state. Like so many Manchu creations, these banners came from a Central Eurasian culture that forged strong links between male hunters and warriors. The banners cut across kinship, tribal, and ethnic lines, allowing strong control by administrators at the top, and making possible systematic military strategy and logistical planning.
The Manchus also drew on commercial resources in all directions: they were not merely an agrarian and pastoral state. They extracted profitable ginseng exports from Korea, and they profited from trading licenses with the Ming dynasty, while they also relied heavily on the densely settled agricultural region of Liaoning in the south for grain, clothing, metals, and other necessities.
The cultural flexibility of the Manchus also allowed them to build coalitions. Because of common pastoral connections, many Mongols served as cavalry forces in the Manchu banners, and Mongols married into the nobility. Han Chinese, Koreans, and even Russians could be enrolled in banners, each with specific functions in the military state.
The key innovation the Manchus made that overcame the weaknesses of other pastoral nomadic formations was to override the principle of kinship with bureaucratic rule. Whereas most pastoralists determined the succession to power by transferring leadership to the eldest brother, or uncles, usually touching off a devastating internecine struggle, the Manchus, using Chinese advisors, established a much more regular succession system, overcoming the predominant influence of powerful nobles. The conflict between the tribal and bureaucratic principles, however, continued to afflict Manchu rulership from the foundation of the state through the mid-17th century. Once the Kangxi emperor had established clear superiority over his regents and over military feudal servitors, however, the Manchus had clear superior organizational capacity over the rival Zunghars, who never succeeded in creating smooth transitions. Ultimately, it was organizational capacity, not sheer military force, that ensured Manchu expansion into Central Eurasia.
The Zunghars, for their part, also incorporated multiple cultural and institutional elements into their state formation. Their core was the western branch of the Mongols, who had been one of the component tribes of Chinggis Khan’s empire in the 13th century. After the disintegration of Chinggis’ empire in the 14th century, these Oirats, as they were called, still remained in western Mongolia, and they staged raids on the Ming Empire. But since they did not follow the direct line of succession from Chinggis’ lineage, they could not make credible claims to becoming a Mongol khan. The formation of the Zunghar state depended on other resources, from Russian trade, from the oases of Xinjiang, and from Tibet.
The conflict of the two empires began under the leadership of two dynamic, hearty young men, Aisin Gioro Xuanye, known as the Kangxi emperor (r. 1662–1722), and Galdan (r. 1671–1697), a vigorous Mongol warrior who returned from a Tibetan seminary to take power after the assassination of his brother. For over twenty years, these two leaders confronted each other in an epic struggle to conquer territory and win the allegiance of the feuding tribes of Mongolia.
Kangxi and Galdan Contend for Power
When Galdan took power, the western Mongols were divided into contentious factions, but he soon established his superiority, taking vengeance for his brother’s death and dominating the rival princes. He offered tribute to the Qing in 1677 so as to reinforce his legitimacy, but he also attacked other Mongol chiefs and captured the important oases of Hami and Turfan and the other rich oasis towns of eastern Turkestan. He, like the Kangxi emperor, had established unrivaled personal power through success in military campaigns. At the same time, like his Manchu counterpart, he created an administrative structure, relying on Tibetan advisors, and producing documents written in a modified version of the Mongolian script.
The Kangxi emperor, for his part, while Galdan was expanding, defeated his rival nobles in southwest China and captured Taiwan, thus completing the Qing conquest of the core of Ming China. Now he had the opportunity to turn to the Northwest, to confront the rising Mongolian state. Kangxi, who had partially Mongolian heritage himself, understood that politics in the Mongolian realms required more than military victory and the assertion of Han Chinese Confucian norms. It also required recognition of the personal charisma of the ruler, so that Mongols would see him as the supreme khan. Kangxi embraced the unprecedented goal of incorporating all Mongols under Qing rule, along with all Han Chinese. In this way, he could re-create the universal empire of Chinggis Khan, but ensure its durability by tying it closely to the large agrarian population of China. He launched four military campaigns against Galdan to demonstrate his personal determination and military prowess. Not all of them succeeded, but they broadcast effectively the image of a dynamic, young, vigorous ruler who embraced the virtues of both the military and civilian realms.
During the course of this conflict, a third party intervened: the Russian state, which had expanded to the east in search of fur. Fur had been a vital resource of the Russian states ever since the 14th and 15th centuries. After defeating the khan of Siberia in 1581, roving adventurers known as Cossacks penetrated east of the Ural Mountains, placing fortresses on the headwaters of major rivers, and fanning out to extract tribute in furs from the local tribes. By 1649 they had reached the Amur River and the Pacific Coast. Until they passed east of Lake Baikal, they encountered little resistance, but they came up against the early Manchu state and several Mongol federations in the 17th century. The Qing destroyed the Russian fortress at Albazin in 1658; the Russians rebuilt it, but the Qing prepared to destroy it again. Just at this time, however, the Kangxi emperor needed to rally forces against his Zunghar foe, and he feared a Russian-Mongol alliance against him. The stage was set for negotiations, when Kangxi’s Jesuit advisors and high Manchu nobles met with the Russians at the town of Nerchinsk, in order to settle the terms of a treaty defining the border and establishing commercial relations. In the Treaty of Nerchinsk of 1689, China’s first treaty with a Western power, the Qing agreed to settle the boundary between the two states, setting up markers along the ridge of the mountains. Later, it negotiated a separate trade treaty, the treaty of Kiakhta, in 1727. The Nerchinsk treaty was a triumph of intercultural communication and negotiation, and only the threat of the Zunghar state made it possible. It was drawn up in five languages (Chinese, Latin, Manchu, Mongol, and Russian), and the Latin language was the primary language. Thus the Qing state established its permanent borders with Russia in Central Eurasia with the aid of the Jesuits, an international religious organization that had networks in both Russia and China.
The Russians kept the terms of the agreement, sending Swedish experts in cartography to define the border, returning prisoners and military deserters who crossed the border, and setting up a profitable trade in furs in Beijing, brought by tributary missions to the emperor. The Qing, for their part, could now turn against their Zunghar foe without fearing a coalition against them. In 1690, following their first military victory, Qing officials were able to draw many of the eastern Mongolian tribes into a treaty of alliance, leaving the Zunghars isolated in western Mongolia.1
The Kangxi emperor then became concerned about Galdan’s connections with two other far-flung regions of Central Eurasia besides Russia: Tibet and Xinjiang. The Mongols themselves, as Tibetan Buddhists, revered the Dalai Lama in Lhasa and his Mongolian representatives. Kangxi informed the Dalai Lama that he had secured the submission of the eastern Mongols, bringing peace to Mongolia, and urged him to ensure that Galdan did not break peaceful relations. At the same time, the Qing moved to cut off supplies to Galdan from oases in eastern Xinjiang, so that he could not rebuild his supplies. But the Qing troops could not advance any farther into Mongolia without overstraining their supply lines, so Galdan remained out of reach in the far west.
The emperor conceived of a plan to lure Galdan farther east, so that he could confront him in a decisive battle. In 1696 he set out with three armies across the Gobi Desert, heading for the monastery town of Urga, modern Ulan Bataar. The generals paid close attention to three crucial kinds of supplies: grain, transported by Chinese troops; horses, provided by Mongolian cavalry; and gunpowder weaponry, transported on camelback across the steppes. The emperor wrote letters back to his son in Beijing describing with enthusiasm the bracing conditions of campaigning in these remote regions. Galdan did not know that three large armies were heading after him, and the emperor enticed him with promises of negotiations in order to ensure that he would not flee. Galdan, however, fled west, but ran into the 14,000 troops of the Manchu general Fiyanggu at the small valley of Jao Modo, just east of modern Ulaan Baatar. On June 12, 1696, Fiyanggu gained a crushing victory over Galdan and his 5,000 men, forcing Galdan to abandon his army and run for his life. Fiyanggu had nearly run out of grain supplies, so the battle took place at just barely the right time. Now nearly all the Mongol princes praised the emperor as the leader of the “family” of the peoples of Central Eurasia.
Galdan himself, however, survived to fight another day. Despite his crushing defeat, he was still able to rebuild his forces in far western Mongolia. The Qing armies themselves were also exhausted, lacking grain supplies, and many generals opposed further campaigns, despite the emperor’s insistence on eliminating his Mongol rival. The emperor’s third campaign led nowhere, but on his fourth campaign, without any fighting, he could consolidate support from the Mongols of Qinghai, the Dalai Lama in Tibet, and Muslims in the northwest, as he marched through Ningxia inspecting the plans of the Great Wall. He did not confront Galdan again in battle, but Galdan himself died in suspicious circumstances (most likely poisoned by dissident advisors) in April 1697. On July 4, the emperor celebrated his victory in a grand military review in the capital, as his supporters praised him for the “final elimination” of the Mongol menace. The next year, Galdan’s remains were crushed and scattered to the winds. Most of his followers, however, were pardoned and incorporated into Qing banners as bondservants, and his son became a member of the imperial bodyguard.
After completing his campaigns, the emperor commissioned historical projects to inscribe the official version into permanent memories. He fixed his narrative in print and in stone by 1708. But the story of the Zunghar resistance had not ended. It would take another half century and two more emperors to achieve the Kangxi emperor’s goal.
The Zunghar State Survives
Galdan’s death did not mean the end of the Zunghar state. His nephew, Tsewang Rabdan (r. 1697–1727), a very effective leader, expanded the Zunghars’ power, and Tsewang Rabdan’s son, Galdan Tseren (r. 1727–1745), inflicted a humiliating defeat on the Qing army. In the first twenty years of the 18th century, the battlefront was stable, but both sides explored further opportunities to gain allies and resources. The Russians learned of the presence of gold in Yarkand, an oasis under Zunghar control, and sent an expedition there, but the Zunghars doubted their friendly intentions and drove them out. Russia instead turned its intentions toward gaining profits from fur caravans to Beijing. Meanwhile, the Qing scouted out opportunities for further Mongolian alliances, sending the Manchu envoy Tulisen on a far-ranging mission through Russian territory to the banks of the Volga River, where he attempted to win over Ayuki Khan, whose Torghut Mongols had broken away from the Zunghar domination in the mid-17th century. Tulisen’s Manchu account, later translated into Chinese, Russian, and many European languages, became an essential source of information about Central Eurasian geography, politics, and cultures for centuries thereafter. The Scotsman John Bell, at the same time, wrote a private account as part of his service to the Russian tsar, and the Russian envoy Ivan Unkovskii traveled to the Zunghar khan’s headquarters for a personal interview. It was a time of mutual suspicion, intelligence gathering, and searches for allies.
Further expanding their spatial horizons, Qing forces invaded Tibet in 1720, taking advantage of a schism among the Mongols supporting the Lamas in Lhasa. They also captured a young boy whom they promoted as the Panchen Lama under their control. Tsewan Rabdan, for his part, moved east to confront the Qing at the eastern oases of Hami and Turfan. The Qing warded off his attacks, but were not able to advance farther into Xinjiang. The death of the Kangxi emperor in 1722, and the disputed politics of his succession, meant that Qing incursions into Tibet and Xinjiang had limited permanent results. But the new Yongzheng emperor won out over his brother, who had been out of the capital campaigning when the Kangxi emperor died. In this way, the frontier campaigns affected not only the territory but also the leadership of the empire.
The Yongzheng emperor (r. 1722–1735), realizing that the empire was overstretched, cut back on military adventures and inefficiency, focusing most of his efforts on domestic reform. He is best known for his fiscal reforms, which aimed to reduce informal surcharges and instill honesty into the officials and their tax-collecting agents. But his frontier policies also had unexpected results. Although the emperor wanted to consolidate forces, withdrawing them from indefensible outposts, he, like his father, ended up conducting a tug of war with Tsewang Rabdan over the loyalty of the Muslims of Turfan. The Zunghar leader tried to move them westward, while the Qing tried to move them eastward. At the same time, Qing forces intervened in a civil war in Qinghai, the site of the great Taersi monastery, obtaining a decisive victory over local Mongolian forces.
Despite his original intentions, Yongzheng found himself promoting an aggressive, expansive foreign policy against the resistance of his best generals, and at first he seemed to have obtained stunning results. The succession of Galdan Tseren to power in 1727 seemed to offer another golden opportunity to eliminate the Zunghar state. In 1729 Yongzheng sent his best generals far into western Mongolia and to Urumqi in Xinjiang, in an ambitious drive to capture the western regions. But his general marched into a trap and suffered a disastrous ambush at Khobdo, losing 80 percent of his army and all of his Mongolian allies. The emperor, in despair, wailed that heaven had abandoned him. Galdan Tseren, for his part, however, was not able to take advantage of his victory, so a stalemate ensued. Yongzheng offered truce negotiations in the last year before his death.
From the 1730s to 1745, after the new Qianlong emperor took power in China, a stalemate ensued. The Qing shifted their tactics from military expeditions to the use of trade and tribute to obtain leverage on the Mongols and their allies. For their part, to shore up their fragile state, the Zunghars desperately searched for allies among lamas in Lhasa, traders in Central Eurasia, and Russia. The new Qianlong emperor (r. 1736–1795) concluded, like Yongzheng before him, that he should avoid expensive military expeditions. He continued Yongzheng’s truce and established regular trading relations in 1739. A regulated “tributary” trade continued from 1739 to 1754 both in Beijing and at the border towns. The Zunghars brought products of the steppes: animals like horses, sheep, cattle, and camels, furs, medicinal products, and dried grapes, in exchange for Chinese brocades, tea, and if necessary silver. The Qing limited the size of embassies and prohibited the export of gunpowder, metals, and weaponry. These regulations followed those which applied to the Russian caravan trade, Koreans, and other neighbors.
Soon, the border trade at Suzhou in western Gansu leapt beyond official limits, drawing in merchants from the Central Eurasian oases. Officials of the Qing found it easiest to delegate trade to their own merchants, calling it “merchant management under official supervision.” This was the same slogan used later in the 19th-century self-strengthening program. The officials also loaned sums to the border merchants to give them the necessary capital, just as they would later do with the Hong merchants in Canton. The Zunghars could specify the goods they wanted so that merchants had an assured outlet for them. Although Qing regulations tried to limit the outflow of silver, the opportunities for profit were so promising that officials themselves bought Zunghar goods with silver supplies.
Besides the border trade at Suzhou, the trade in “boiled tea” (manja in Manchu) between Mongolia and Tibet linked the Zunghars to Central Eurasian markets and allies. This trade route, which passed through Qing territory in Qinghai, allowed Zunghar Mongols and their Central Eurasian merchants to carry goods from Mongolia to Tibet, and to present gifts to lamas along the route. The Zunghar leaders, who gained intelligence from their meeting with the lamas and profits from selling their goods, constantly pressed to expand the missions, but the Qing authorities insisted on careful supervision and limitation of their access to other Mongols and Tibetans. Yet despite mutual suspicions, the manja trade flourished during this brief time period, as it suited the long-term goals of both sides. The Qing expected the trade to “soften” the barbarian Mongols, and “transform” them into submissive subjects, while the Zunghars could expand their trade and diplomatic contacts and gain resources for their state. The Qing, however, remained suspicious of the Zunghars, never saw them as reliable subjects, and kept on the lookout for opportunities to destroy the state. That opportunity arrived in 1745, when a succession crisis in the Zunghar lands gave the Qing a new chance to intervene.
The Fall of the Zunghar State
The death of Galdan Tseren in 1745 touched off a struggle for power that led to the destruction of the Zunghar state. Tibet also fell into turmoil, giving the Qing a chance to reinforce its allies there. While two Zunghar nobles, Dawaci and Amursana, contended for power, the Qing officials watched carefully, and they succeeded in forging an alliance with Amursana, allowing them to send armies against Dawaci. In 1755, the armies set out, aided by Qing Mongol allies, while the Russians rejected Dawaci’s appeals for aid. The Qing treaties with Russia had succeeded in their strategic aims. Although the Qing armies quickly achieved victory, Amursana did not get the absolute power he craved, so he rebelled against the Qing, instigating a second Qing expedition. At the same time, an important Mongolian ally of the Qing rebelled, putting all of Mongolia in a critical state. Qianlong, who never left Beijing, harangued his field commanders to pursue Amursana as vigorously as possible, showing no sympathy for the immense difficulties of moving armies through the vast steppes, farther than any other Beijing based army had ever gone. The exasperated emperor then called for the ultimate weapon: elimination of the fighting men of the Zunghar population by starvation and massacre. Unlike other Mongols, who received support when they surrendered, the emperor had little faith in winning over the tenaciously resistant Zunghars. According to the estimate of the 19th-century historian Wei Yuan, the emperor’s forces killed up to 20 percent of the male population, giving the women and children as servants to other commanders, while 40 percent of the population died of smallpox, and 20 percent fled to Russian and Kazakh regions. By the mid-18th century, of the Zunghar population of around 600,000, not a trace remained who preserved their ethnic identity.
Amursana himself, with no people to lead, escaped to Russian territory and died on September 21, 1757, at the age of thirty-five. Despite the emperor’s insistence, the Russians refused to return his body.
One more war completed the story of Qing expansion. Two Muslim leaders in the Tarim basin attacked the local Qing commander, forcing the emperor to send troops once again far into Central Eurasia. By 1759, having suppressed all resistance, the Qing emperor declared the end of his Zunghar campaigns, claiming that with the “entry onto the registers” of the peoples of Zungharia and Turkestan, he had achieved “eternal peace and security on the borders.”
But one more epilogue remained in this epic conflict. The Torghut Mongols, who had fled Zunghar control for the Volga River in the 17th century, and whom Tulisen had visited in 1712, faced constant pressure from Russian settlers and Orthodox priests in their new home. They had fought valiantly for the Russian tsar, but most of them now aimed to return to their homelands in Mongolia. Although they knew little of the fate of the Zunghars, in 1771 over 150,000 of them set out on an epic mass migration eastward to Zungharia. Enduring famine and attacks by other nomads, while evading Russian pursuit, over 100,000 died on this epic long march. They had hoped to find independent pastures, but now the Qing controlled the region, so they appealed to the Qing for refuge. The emperor, rejecting the security concerns of his generals, agreed to give the Torghuts refuge within the empire as part of “our Mongols,” and he boasted of his benevolence in stone inscriptions erected in Ili and at his summer palace in Chengde. This was the final stage in the forceful and strategic gathering of the Mongols under the auspices of the multiethnic Qing state.
Resources, Development, and Trade
Military conquest was only one of the many components that built the Qing empire in Central Eurasia. In the Han dynasty, a scholar told the conquering ruler, “the empire is easy to gain on horseback, but it cannot be ruled on horseback.” He meant, of course, that administration, necessary for the endurance of an empire, required the civil arts, of which scholars held a monopoly. It was self-interested but wise advice. But beyond the scholar class, the Qing rulers and their rivals needed to mobilize economic resources from merchants and peasants and cultural resources dependent on skills in paper and stone. Even the humble historians had their role to play, in documenting and legitimizing the empire’s achievements.
Galdan, the founder of the Zunghar state, knew the importance of extracting natural and economic resources. The Zunghar state required not only horsemen, but miners, armorers, and even casters of cannon to support its military machine. In one account, “he extracted oil from sand, baked earth to make sulfur, and used sulfuric acid to make saltpeter, white as snow. Copper, lead, and fine steel came from the ground. Rocks by the water’s edge produced gold and pearls … no one could surpass [him] in swift horses and numbers of barbarian riders.”2 Its rulers relied on a cosmopolitan group of war captives, including Swedes, Russians, Manchus, and Chinese, to teach their men smelting and mining, and they produced the first native maps of Mongolia with the help of a Swedish expert who had worked for Peter the Great. The state established an urban capital and promoted agriculture as well as factories until its untimely collapse.
The Qing, for their part, also mobilized all the people, natural resources, and skills they possessed to defeat their rivals. When they incorporated defeated Mongols, they allocated them to cavalry detachments and allotted them to strictly bounded pasturelands. They created fixed categories of “tribes” out of the shifting kinship alignments of Central Eurasian peoples, and used these categories for imposition of corvée labor and tax assessments. They also promoted Han immigration to Qinghai, Mongolia, and Xinjiang in order to increase agrarian yields. The Qing administration expanded the scope of its bureaucratic slots as its territory expanded.
Once the Qing completed the conquest of Xinjiang, its administrative tasks increased greatly. Now it had to bring under its umbrella new vast territories, and Muslim oasis peoples as well as nomads. Once again, settlement by Han peasants offered one promising answer, killing two birds with one stone: relieving population pressure in the interior while opening up new frontiers for settlement. Earlier dynasties had established small military colonies in some parts of Xinjiang for a number of decades, but the Qing expanded this policy into a much larger program, including hundreds of thousands of civilians as well as soldiers, spread all over the northern part of the new region.
Xinjiang in its entirety was a military camp, under the jurisdiction of a military general, but some parts of it, like the oases in the east, became civil administrative units, and other regions put the Mongolians under their own banner commanders. In the military colonies, officials made great efforts to invest in water supplies and seeds and to improve yields. Their ideal was to make Xinjiang self-sufficient, so that the interior did not have to support a growing population.
Besides military colonists, Xinjiang received criminal exiles of all kinds: from drug peddlers, arsonists, and rapists to unfortunate high-ranking officials impeached for involvement in political intrigues. They all joined the civilian agricultural colonies under compulsion, but the colonies also attracted venturesome migrants from the northwest seeking to improve their lives in the new western “paradise.” In addition, Turkic agriculturalists from the southern oases, known as Taranchis, migrated to the north, bringing their special skills in management of the underground irrigation canals.
Through the 18th and 19th centuries, the Qing rulers of Xinjiang, who were mainly Manchu, relied on local elites, known as begs, to run commercial networks and agricultural development projects. The developers of Xinjiang, then, were a diverse lot of Han and Manchu officials, soldiers, criminals, Turkic oasis dwellers, and local beg capitalists, all engaged in raising the resources from this region to benefit the empire and themselves.3
Xinjiang, however, never paid for itself. It always depended on shipments of money and goods from the interior. Harvests were always precarious in the arid northwest, and the increased demands of soldiers and settlers frequently outran available grain supplies. Granaries were established to provide relief, but sometimes they had to be totally depleted to respond to a crisis, and it would take years to build up reserves again. Despite its successes, it remained a heavily subsidized colonial enterprise, vulnerable to collapse when its core support in the Qing provinces weakened, as it did in the 19th century. Repeated rebellions, culminating in occupation by a Turkic chieftain known as Yakub Beg for twenty years, were an unintended consequence of this developmental policy.
Tying the newly conquered regions to the empire depended on money as well as soldiers and grain. The Qing made efforts to disperse the bronze qian coin widely, making it the primary coin used in trade in daily goods. At the same time, silver imports from the New World grew in the 18th century, and silver became the most convenient method of paying taxes and settling large wholesale accounts. But China’s northwest, including Gansu and Xinjiang, still remained only loosely and sporadically tied to the interior through the 19th century. In times of crisis, merchants moved money and grain to areas of high prices in response to market signals, and the government distributed grain from its granaries for local price relief. But in ordinary times, most trade reverted to very local scales, and much of it was not monetized at all.
Still, the Qing state, acting through local merchants, made strenuous efforts to stimulate monetary circulation, so as to loosen the links that oriented the region toward Central Eurasia and away from the Chinese core. They even minted coins with Arabic script alongside Manchu and Chinese writing to induce local traders to accept them. Even though Xinjiang remained loosely tied to the interior, within Xinjiang itself, certain oases, especially those close to the provincial capital of Urumqi, did develop strong commercial ties to one another.4
Xinjiang’s trade also went across its borders, into Russia, Kazakh territory, Tibet, and Mongolia. The Qing paid special attention to the Kazakhs, since they supplied vast quantities of the magnificent horses that became the bulwark of the cavalry. The Kazakhs regularly presented tribute of nine white horses at the court, but the real trade was that of independent states at market prices, conducted at the border. The Kazakhs lay, for the most part, beyond the tributary zone of nations like Russia, or the subordinated Mongols: they were another diplomatically in the complex web of Eurasian negotiations of the expanded Qing Empire.
Inscribing the Conquest in Paper and Stone
The empire attempted to fix its boundaries literally in stone, and in paper, by defining in maps and histories the space it ruled. Imperial travel, cartography, and inscriptions marked the space under an imperial gaze, so that numerous and diverse peoples would recognize that they belonged to a single imperial realm. The imperial project was more an aspiration than a reality: unlike a modern nation-state, the Qing vision did not penetrate the minds of all its subjects. They held more local concepts of their loyalties, and for them, the emperor was far away. But the Qing projects still left a significant legacy for the nation-state that emerged from its ruins in the 20th century.
Of all the Qing emperors, the Kangxi emperor enjoyed touring the most. During his campaigns against Galdan, he sent over a hundred letters in Manchu back to his son in Beijing. In these letters, the emperor described the exhilaration of the open steppes, as he gathered stones and herbs to bring home. He investigated caves, temples, grasses, and historical sites, musing on earlier conquerors of the region. While in the steppe, he also demanded day-by-day information about his family’s life at home, thus linking his personal concerns with his experience of the remote frontiers. The emperor also conducted inspection tours of south China. These were much more elaborate affairs, complete with large retinues of officials, investigation of waterworks, and heavy banqueting. They marked the civilian counterpart to Kangxi’s military expeditions, likewise putting the Han Chinese south under the emperor’s personal scrutiny.5 He conducted over 125 tours in different directions during his reign.
His successor, Yongzheng, a more austere and less curious ruler, however, seldom moved very far at all. The Qianlong emperor engaged in tours of the lower Yangzi region six times, and he brought Central Eurasian tributary peoples with him, so as to show the skeptical lower Yangzi literati the value of frontier campaigns. But he conducted his military campaigns from the safety of Beijing, and he normally moved only short distances, to the summer palaces in Manchuria.
Inscriptions in stone left more permanent marks on the landscape than the imperial tours. These large stelae covered many sites around the empire with statements in multiple languages: Chinese, Manchu, Mongolian, Tibetan, and sometimes Turkish and other Central Eurasian languages. They epitomized the facts of conquest in grandiose, stereotyped language, omitting inconvenient details, often describing the defeated Zunghars as debased snakes, worms, and drunkards. Heaven’s will, in the view of these inscriptions, inevitably crushed all who resisted the emperor’s benevolent power. At the same time, the Manchu and Mongolian versions, in more simple language, stressed the indomitable military power of a conquering khan, who subjugated his enemies, but showed them benevolence after they submitted.
The emperors also launched large-scale cartographic projects in order to construct a comprehensive view of their dominions. The Zunghars themselves, as mentioned above, also relied on European experts to draw the first maps of their domains. Like the early-modern state builders of Europe, including tsarist Russia, and like the British surveyors of colonial India, they used the latest technology, obtained from Jesuit and other technical advisors, to construct the most accurate possible view. These maps defined strategic locations, administrative centers, and topography to serve imperial interests. They reduced the baffling variety of local customs, divergent measurements, and local ecologies to a standardized norm, so that the state could make its peoples visible and extract resources more efficiently.
During the 19th century, the Qing rulers expanded the scope of their cartography in the horizontal and vertical dimensions. They included more territory, and they mapped existing frontier regions more intensively. Maps of the Mongolian banners from the late Qing period display in remarkable detail each border marker of the assigned pastureland, the essential terrain features, and walls and administrative centers, all labeled in Mongolian or Manchu script.
The Manchu rulers had achieved their goal of fixing the Mongols in place: where the Mongols had once freely roamed the open steppes, now they obtained secure rights to well-defined territories. This was the price of peace.
Paradoxically, the Manchus could not inflict such easy control on their own Manchu and Han populations. Han Chinese migrated illegally into the reserved homeland of the Manchus, while Manchu bannermen came to identify more closely with the southern Chinese cities where they resided than with their putative “homeland” in Manchuria. The expansion of the empire had generated conflicting strains between personal mobility and efforts to fix populations in place.
The emperors not only tried to control spatial allocation of their peoples; they also aimed to master time, by commissioning official histories of their conquests. These narratives conjured up an image of the empire in print, representing its progress through historical time as the unfolding of a personal and cosmic plan. The Kangxi emperor had an account in fifty-one volumes published of his campaigns in 1708, in both Manchu and Chinese, and the Qianlong emperor had his version published in 172 volumes in 1772. These “military campaign histories,” or fanglue, were a new genre created in the Qing. Although they incorporated massive documentation, their main purpose was to demonstrate how the emperors’ infallible, farsighted will won out over his skeptics and enemies, domestic and foreign. They are a tendentious selection from the complete archival record for an ideological purpose. Yet we can still read them against the grain to reveal inconsistences and contradictions that get the researcher beyond the surface image.
The Yongzheng emperor, characteristically, did not commission his own campaign history, perhaps because it would have been difficult to conceal his relative lack of success. He did, however, react in a very personal way to attacks on the legitimacy of Manchu rule, by publishing the remarkable text “Great Righteousness Resolves Confusion” (Dayi Juemilu), in 1730. One obscure Han Chinese scholar, claiming that the Manchus, as alien barbarians, had no right to rule the Han Chinese, appealed to Yue Zhongqi, one of the Han generals leading the campaign, to rebel against the emperor. Yue immediately informed the emperor, but he did not escape suspicion, and the paranoid emperor immediately assumed that the literati of the lower Yangzi were fomenting plots against him. After interrogating the unfortunate scholar under torture, officials easily extracted confessions of his guilt, but the defensive emperor engaged in a large-scale media campaign to refute his accusations. He argued insistently that the Manchus were not racial aliens, but completely a part of the universal moral order defined by heaven. They had brought order to the realm, “wiping away the shame” of the disorganized Ming dynasty, and they had expanded the empire victoriously, bringing unprecedented peace and glory to all of their subjects. Yet the Manchus were a distinct people, with their own virtues: they had not assimilated to Han ways, and they never should. Yongzheng directed his injunctions both at the Han Chinese, making them realize that they owed gratitude to their conquerors, and at his Manchu bannermen, to remind them of the virtuous martial spirit that should constantly inspire them.
The Qianlong emperor, however, embarrassed by revelations in Yongzheng’s text, withdrew it from circulation, replacing it with his own fanglue, which gave a similar but broader account of the Zunghar campaigns than that of Kangxi. From his perspective fifty years later, at the conclusion of the campaigns, the Mongols were no longer a threat, and they deserved recognition as component elements of the universal empire. He passed over the extermination of the Zunghars in near silence, focusing on the regular succession of Mongol khans and their peaceful incorporation into banner units. The sheer scale of Qianlong’s fanglue, with its multiple languages and documents, however, allows us to reconstruct alternative stories.
In addition to official accounts, certain individuals wrote their private accounts of the Qing–Mongol encounter. We can view Tulisen’s account as a personal diplomatic report and travel account, a report from the field filled with valuable perceptions, which became part of the Manchu and Chinese official record. It is one of the few Manchu texts to be incorporated into the massive encyclopedia of classical learning sponsored by Qianlong, the Complete Records of Four Treasuries. The Manchu official Qishiyi, in 1777, also gave a personal account from the frontier quite different from the official version, containing very substantial information about the lands of Central Eurasia, extending as far as the Ottoman Empire. He defended the conquests, but he viewed them more as a personal confrontation between two ambitious leaders than a Heavensent victory, and he made no bones about revealing the massacre, even inflating the death toll.
The Mongols themselves, after the conquest, wrote their own chronicles of Qing rule. In them, they expressed gratitude to the Qing emperor for rescuing them from decline, and bringing peace and benevolent rule. The prominence of Chinggis Khan, the great founder of Mongolian Empire, declined, in favor of increasing focus on the local affairs of the Mongolia banners under Qing administration. Qing scholars themselves wrote official biographies of the Mongolian nobles, in Mongolian, Manchu, and Chinese, judging them according to their loyalty. Only in far distant Russia did one chronicler of the Kalmyk khans give a dissenting point of view. And in oral traditions, Mongols still passed on heroic tales of Amursana’s exploits, prophesying the heroic prince’s return. In the 20th century, when Mongolia declared its independence from Chinese rule, these tales became material for new nationalist narratives.
Global Implications of Qing Expansion
Stepping back further, we may view the implications of the Qing conquests from a global perspective. Western and Chinese writers in the 19th century once again reworked the story of conquest to fit large-scale accounts placing China in the new world of colonialism and geopolitics. Wei Yuan (1794–1856), the very influential scholar reacting to China’s defeat in the Opium War, wrote an extensive narrative of Qing expansion in all directions, hoping to inspire his fellow Han Chinese with the military spirit they needed to ward off Western imperialism. Lord Macartney, whose failed trade mission to the Qing court in 1793 inspired many derogatory denunciations of the closed empire’s obstinate refusal to open its ports to trade in goods such as opium, nevertheless realized that China’s relationship with Russia, an outgrowth of the treaties of Nerchinsk and Kiakhta, in reaction to British incursions, could reshape Eurasian politics. Halford Mackinder, the great Scot theorist of geopolitics, in 1904 outlined his theory of the vital importance of the Central Eurasian heartland for the dominance of great global powers. China, Mongolia, Russia, and Central Asia, playing the “Great Game” of spying and travel in Tibet against tsarist schemes, became major concerns for the British and for many other geopolitical historians of the early 20th century.
Chinese nationalists of the 20th century, wounded by imperialist incursions, denigrated Manchu achievements, preferring to invoke the glories of ancient Chinese culture and the example of the Han-dominated Ming dynasty. But the ideologies of both the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China, which rely heavily on invoking the unity of multiple nationalities under a single Han-dominated regime, build on the territorial, historical, and cultural achievements of the Qing at its peak expansionary period.
Not only nationalists, but theorists of state and nation formation today, ought to pay close attention to the Qing conquests. As one of the largest and most rapid imperial expansions in world history, they rank in scale and significance with British, American, and Russian territorial aggrandizement, and they raise similar questions about the role of economic growth, cultural heritage, and political ideology in imperial formations. We may choose to focus on the specifically Central Eurasian features of the Qing: its links with Mongol and earlier steppe traditions, its focus on horsemanship and personal rule, and its familiarity with multiple cultural formations on the frontier, or we may place the Qing next to comparable European states and empires of the early modern era. The Qing, in its Eurasian campaigns, followed global processes and introduced distinctive regional cultural characteristics. This makes the story of the conquests a fascinating topic both for comparative world history and for the understanding of the roots of contemporary China.
Discussion of the Literature
Although every textbook mentions the expansion of the Qing dynasty, very few studies in Western languages follow the Central Eurasian conquests in detail, and none have used the full range of sources available. The great French philologist Paul Pelliot pioneered the subject with his notes on the western Mongols, published posthumously in 1960. Maurice Courant, a French diplomat, was the first to outline the Qing–Zunghar conflict from a geopolitical point of view, and Baddeley’s documentary collection of Sino–Russian relations reflected this interest as well.6 During the first half of the 20th century, Chinese historians tended to blame the Qing for its weakness, rather than celebrating its expansion. The Western travelers and adventurers in Xinjiang and Mongolia at this time either took a very long-term view, such as that of Owen Lattimore, or focused on contemporary events.
After the victory of the Communist Party in China in 1949, Soviet and Chinese studies of the Qing agreed on its “feudal” social structure in Marxist terms, but after the Sino–Soviet split of the 1960s, their interpretations of Qing expansion divided into nationalist camps. Chinese scholars stressed the incorporation of multiple nationalities under Qing rule, viewing the conquests as benevolent reunification of Chinese territory. Soviet scholars stressed the essentially aggressive nature of the Qing state and its oppression of Mongols and other Central Eurasian peoples. The scholars also used different primary sources. Zlatkin’s study of 1964, the first detailed study in any Western language, relied on Russian archival documents and Manchu sources. It is a valuable, but partial and tendentious, account. Chinese scholars have produced a vast amount of writing on border relations, and a major project on the Zunghar campaigns undertaken in the 1980s produced a synthetic account and collections of important sources. Most Chinese scholarship relies only on Chinese language sources, but a few scholars have used Manchu materials as well. Perdue (2005) includes archival and printed sources in Russian, Chinese, and Manchu, and embraces topics beyond the military campaigns themselves. Recently, several scholars have studied Qing rule over Xinjiang after the conquest, joining effectively military, economic, and social analysis.7
The larger topic of Qing frontier relations has generated a vigorous debate in the West and in China, because of its intimate connection to the identity of the modern nation-state. Proponents of the “New Qing History” thesis stress the importance of Manchu identity for Qing rule and the key significance of frontier military and economic relations.8 Furthermore, many local studies of separate border areas have highlighted the distinctive features of ethnic relations on each frontier.9 Many Chinese critics, by contrast, insist that the Manchus became Sinicized, and that Qing society constituted a single unified cultural space. This lively debate will develop further, as historians turn their attention to global connections of imperial China and to efforts to place the Qing in comparative perspective with other early modern empires. The contending forces in the contemporary world of inward-looking nationalism, stressing Chinese uniqueness, and cosmopolitan comparative approaches linking China to the wider world, will continue to shape historian’s perspectives, and history itself will constantly figure as a rhetorical tool in these debates.
Archival and Manuscript Sources
Primary sources in Manchu and Chinese are found in the Number One Historical Archives, Beijing. The most important sources are the Gongzhongdang Zhupi Zouzhe (Palace Memorials and Vermilion Rescripts), organized under the categories of land clearance, minority peoples, taxation and granaries, military supply, and population and grain price reports, and in Manchu, the Manwen Lufu Dang’an. The archives in Beijing have now published many Manchu documents related to Xinjiang, Tibet, and Mongolia. In Russian archives the Siberian Governors’ reports on Mongol and Chinese relations are found in the Rossisskiy Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov (Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts) and Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Imperii (Archive of Foreign Relations of Russia), 1680–1800. See also Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii XVII-XVIII vv. Dokumenty i materialy.(Documents on International Relations in Central Asia, 17th and 18th centuries.)
Scholars have published source materials on China, Russia, and Central Eurasia since the early 20th century. In 1919 John Baddeley collected and translated valuable documents from Russian archives. Materials from the Qing archives also became available after the fall of the dynasty.10 Japanese scholars obtained the old Manchu archive when they occupied Manchuria, and they launched a project to transcribe and translate it in its entirety. Later, the archives in Taiwan published a reprint of the original Manchu version. Taiwan has also reprinted the travel account of Qishiyi. Japanese scholars also edited and translated Tulisen’s Manchu account of his travels.11 There is also a German translation of many of the memorials of Funingga, the leading general against the Zunghars.12 Russian scholars have edited several collections of archival documents on Russian relations with Mongolia and China.13 The military-campaign histories commissioned by the Kangxi and Qianlong emperors have appeared in modern reprints in their Chinese versions, and parts of the Manchu version are available.14
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Crossley, P. K., H. F. Siu, and D. S. Sutton. Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006.Find this resource:
Elliott, M. C.The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001.Find this resource:
Elverskog, J.Our Great Qing: The Mongols, Buddhism and the State in Late Imperial China. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2006.Find this resource:
Hostetler, L.Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.Find this resource:
Kim, K.Borderland Capitalism: Turkestan Produce, Qing Silver, and the Birth of an Eastern Market. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016.Find this resource:
Millward, J. A.Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759–1864. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998.Find this resource:
Perdue, P. C.China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia. Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2005.Find this resource:
Rawski, E. S.The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.Find this resource:
Reinhard, W., ed. Empires and Encounters: 1350–1750. A History of the World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015.Find this resource:
Zhunge’er Shilue Bianxiezu. Zhunge’er Shilue. Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1985.Find this resource:
Zlatkin, I. Ia. Istoriia Dzhungarskogo Khanstva, (1635–1758). Moscow: Nauka, 1964.Find this resource:
(1.) P. C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2005), 175.
(2.) Perdue, China Marches West, 304.
(3.) K. Kim, Borderland Capitalism: Turkestan Produce, Qing Silver, and the Birth of an Eastern Market (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016).
(4.) J. A. Millward, Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759–1864 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998).
(5.) M. Chang, A Court on Horseback: Imperial Touring and the Construction of Qing Rule, 1680–1785 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).
(6.) P. Pelliot, Notes critiques d’histoire kalmouke (Paris, Librairie d’Amerique et d’Orient, 1960); M. Courant, L’Asie Centrale aux 17e et 18e siècles: Empire Kalmouk ou Empire Mantchou? (Paris: Librairie A. Picard and fils, 1912).
(7.) K. Kim, Borderland Capitalism: Turkestan Produce, Qing Silver, and the Birth of an Eastern Market (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016); J. A. Millward, Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759–1864 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998).
(8.) P. K. Crossley, A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); M. C. Elliott, The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001).
(9.) J. Elverskog, Our Great Qing: The Mongols, Buddhism and the State in Late Imperial China (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2006); C. P. Giersch, Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China’s Yunnan Frontier (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); L. Hostetler, Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); E. J. Teng, Taiwan’s Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683–1895 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004).
(10.) J. Baddeley, Russia, Mongolia, China, Being Some Record of the Relations between Them from the Beginning of the XVIIth Century to the Death of the Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, A.D. 1602–1676 (London: Macmillan, 1919); Da Qing Lichao Shilu (Historical Records of the Qing dynasty), Kangxi, Yongzheng, Qianlong reigns. Taibei, 1970.
(11.) Kanda Nobuo et al., eds., Manbun Rôtô:Tongki Fuka Sindaha Hergen i Dangse (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1955–1959); Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan, Jiu Manzhou Dang (Taibei: Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan, 1966); Xiyu Wenjianlu. Taibei, Wenhai Chubanshe, 1969); Tulisen, Lakcaha Jecende takoraha ejehe bithe (Kôchû Iikiroku: Tulisen’s I-yu-lu, 1964). Tenri, Tenri Daigaku Oyasato Kenkyujo).
(12.) E. S. Kraft, Zum Dsungarenkrieg im 18 Jahrhundert:Berichte des Generals Funingga (Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1953).
(13.) N. F. Demidova and V. S. Miasnikov, eds., Russko-kitaiskie otnosheniia v XVII veke: Materialy i dokumenty (Moscow: Nauka, 1969–1972). N. F. Demidova, ed., Materialy po Istorii Russko-Mongol’skikh Otnoshenii: Russko-mongol’skie otnosheniia, 1685–1691: sbornik dokumentov (Moscow: Izdatel’skaia Firma Vostochnaia Literatura, 2000).
(14.) Fu Heng, ed., Pingding Zhungar Fanglue (Record of Pacification of the Zunghars) (Beijing: Xinhua Shudian, 1990); Zhang Yushu, comp., Qinzheng Pingding Shuomo Fanglue (Beijing: Zhongguo Shudian, 1986).